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Service triads, in which a buyer contracts with a supplier to deliver services directly to the buyer’s 
customer, represent an emerging business model. This special issue is dedicated to this theme. To set 
the context, in this lead article, we first define service triads, both as a phenomenon and a research 
topic. We then provide a review of different strands of existing research and various theoretical 
frameworks that can inform our study of service triads. This culminates in an outline of a research 
agenda that can guide future study. As such, this paper not only introduces the articles in the special 
issue, but is also intended as a point of reference and motivation for further work on service triads, 
and on triads in general.  
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 The growth in specialization and outsourcing among firms has given rise to an operations and 
supply landscape that is increasingly based on networks rather than large vertically integrated firms 
(Buhman et al., 2005, Hayes, 2008). Firms focus on what they can do best, and outsource the 
remaining tasks to outside providers (Holcomb and Hitt, 2007). This involves in many instances key 
service operations (Sako, 2006). A large share of these services becomes part of the buying 
organization’s value proposition to its customers: they are purchased by one organization from 
another, but delivered to a third party—the customer. These services are being referred to as ‘front-
end’ services (Balakrishnan et al., 2008) or ‘component’ services (Van der Valk et al., 2009).   
 For example, if a software company outsources its helpdesk services to a third-party call-center, 
the primary service interaction is between the customer and the call-center, not between the customer 
and the software company, even though the customer has a contractual relationship with the software 
company. Other instances include manufacturers of capital equipment using maintenance service 
providers to work directly with end-users, as well as many third-party logistics settings. In the public 
sector, public transportation service providers often operate under specific government contracts 
(concessions) to provide a service to the general public.  
 The ensuing relationships between buyer, supplier and the (buying organization’s) customer can be 
viewed as a ‘service triad’, in which a buyer contracts with a supplier to deliver services directly to 
the buyer’s customer (Li and Choi, 2009, Niranjan and Metri, 2008). The basic service triad is shown 
in Figure 1. It consists of the buyer, supplier and customer. Importantly, such service triads entail a 
structure of inter-organizational relationships that is fundamentally different to that encountered in the 
more linear supply chains especially observed in manufacturing. The critical point about the triadic 
structure is that each actor has a direct connection with the other two; such connections may be 
constant or intermittent. Some triads’ service delivery activities are only mobilized rarely – maybe 
never. For example, car repair shops are only brought into contact with the policy-holder (customer) if 
the customer has an accident that is covered by his/her policy with the insurance company (buyer). 

















 In the examples above, the research focus is often on the buyer as the active player. But similar 
configurations can be observed when customers play an initiating role, using buyers (intermediaries), 
for example in the form of project management firms, to facilitate their access to suppliers (service 
providers) (Flowers, 2007, Mabert and Schoenherr, 2001, Schoenherr and Mabert, 2003). 
  Although inter-organizational triads are not an entirely new research topic, there is a growing 
interest in recent times, particularly within the operations management and supply chain management 
(OM-SCM) field. There, the interest in triads received a strong boost around 2008-2009, with various 
conceptual papers and essays published on the Operations & Supply Management Forum (set up by 
the editors of the Journal of Operations Management), and a debate between Choi and Wu (2009a) 
and Dubois (2009) in the Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management. In this latter debate, Choi 
and Wu argued: “We need to study how in a network, a dyad is affected by another dyad. Therefore, 
to study a network, studying triads becomes imperative. … Simply, dyads are inadequate in capturing 
the interactive nature inherent in a network.” (2009a: 265). 
 Against the background of this call for more OM-SCM research on triads, we suggest that service 
triads merit specific attention. Because their primary operations involve a service, particular issues 
come to the fore. Critically, and in contrast to many other forms of triads, the supplier needs to have 
direct exchange with the customer, in order to deliver its service. For this delivery, the supplier 
depends on inputs, typically from customers (Sampson and Froehle, 2006) but, in a triad setting, quite 
often also from buyers. A service triad is therefore different from the ‘bidirectional service supply 
chain’ (Sampson, 2000), where the supplier only has one counterpart to rely on for inputs, i.e. a buyer 
that is also the customer of the service. Thus, triads provide a critical context to better understand the 
nature and relative importance of various inputs for the service process. The notion of an inherent 
supplier-customer exchange also highlights the fluctuating role that a buyer may have in such service 
triads. For instance, how can a buying organization, reliably and efficiently, monitor service quality if 
it is not involved in the actual service delivery, especially when this quality is highly dependent on the 
interaction between supplier and customer?    
 Such service triads, however, have not received much specific coverage in prior research. A few 
exceptions exist. For example, service triads  have been studied using social network theory (Li and 
Choi, 2009), drawing attention to the dynamics of relationships between the three triad members as an 
outsourcing arrangement is established. Nevertheless, recent discussions suggest that there are 
opportunities to extend the study of triads using other theoretical approaches, from within OM-SCM 
and from outside our discipline (Choi and Wu, 2009c).  
 This special issue is a response to that call, and the present lead article introducing the special issue 
has three specific objectives. The first objective is to define service triads, both as a phenomenon and 
a research topic. The second objective is to provide a review of different strands of existing research 
and various theoretical frameworks that can inform our study of service triads. Outlining a research 
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agenda is the third main objective. As such, the article not only provides a background for the articles 
in the special issue, but it is also intended as a point of reference and motivation for further work on 
service triads, and on triads in general.  
 While previous research has begun to apply the notion of triads within the domain of operations 
management, primarily focusing on structural aspects of triads, the current article is aimed to help 
advance our understanding of the impact of the structure and dynamics of service triads on specific 
OM-SCM issues, such as service risk management; quality management in services; and service 
capacity management. In other words; we intend to stimulate research and the development of 
theories on OM-SCM phenomena in service triads, rather than theory development and testing 
regarding the (dynamic) structure of triads in service supply chains. Further research on OM-SCM 
phenomena in service triads also would help, more broadly, fill the gap in research on business-to-
business services (Ostrom et al., 2010). 
 In the following section, we discuss OM-SCM research on triads. Section 3 discusses triad studies 
in management research and (other) social sciences. Section 4 reviews the distinctive features and 
various forms of service triads. In section 5 we outline a research agenda along three dimensions: 
specific topics for research in service triads, alternative theoretical approaches, and methodological 
aspects. Section 6 introduces the papers in this special issue, with section 7 offering some concluding 
thoughts.  
 
2. OM-SCM research on triads 
 For our review of prior literature, we examined (not just service) triad studies from the OM-SCM 
domain—and from the wider area of management and organization research. These studies were 
collected in two ways. First, we searched the Web of Science portal for journal articles in the field of 
management, using the term ‘triads’ (no year limits). To verify that we did not miss any relevant 
articles, we checked the reference lists of the initial set of articles. We then manually selected the 
relevant articles from these two sets that represented studies focusing on inter-organizational triads 
(e.g. leaving out studies that dealt with the US-Europe-Japan triad). Secondly, we added to this set 
conference papers and dissertations with which we were already familiar or came across in reference 
lists. We selected publications that presented a substantial discussion of triads, omitting those that 
only mentioned them in passing. 
 This resulted in a set of 30 publications, which are described in Appendix 1. While we cannot 
review each of these studies in depth here, the appendix provides the most salient descriptors. In the 
main text, we select for discussion those studies that seem to be important milestones in triad 
research.  
 
2.1. Triads  
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 Most existing OM-SCM research on triads is concerned with the triad formed by the buyer and 
two upstream suppliers in a manufacturing context (Figure 2).  It is typically concerned with how the 
buyer can influence the relationship between the suppliers. Prominent among this research is the work 
of Choi, Wu and colleagues. Their first study (Choi et al., 2002) began from the observation that, as 
firms reduce the number of direct suppliers that they use, they can and do seek more actively to 
influence the relationships between suppliers. It examines three archetypes of supplier-supplier 
relationships – competitive, cooperative and ‘co-opetitive’ – and develops several propositions 




Figure 2. Buyer-supplier-supplier triad  
 
 Wu and Choi (2005) develop this further by focusing on the active shaping of the supplier-supplier 
relationship by the buyer; the paper presents five archetypes, characterizing the different approaches 
of the buyers, and develops propositions, most of which concern supplier-supplier relationships and 
their effect on performance. The paper also signals the aim of this program of research, namely to 
develop theory – effectively a contingency theory – regarding the ideal types of supplier-supplier 
relationships from the buyer’s point of view, depending on the product type and the buyer’s strategy. 
Choi and Wu (2009c) again develop archetypes of triadic relationship patterns, this time using balance 
theory (Heider, 1958) and the social network concept of structural holes (Burt, 1992). Wu et al. 
(2010) seek to examine empirically whether buyer-induced supplier-supplier ‘co-opetition’ affects 
performance. It finds, unexpectedly, that such co-opetition is correlated with worse supplier 
performance, but is ambivalent as to whether the poor performance is due to the firms’ resources 
being overstretched by the requirement to co-operate, or whether the requirement to co-operate arises 
from the supplier firms’ having exhibited poor performance, i.e. the reverse causality. In any case, it 
demonstrates empirically that buyers’ efforts do have an effect on supplier-supplier interaction. 
 Another notable study in this vein is by Dubois and Fredriksson (2008). They propose the notion 
of ‘triadic sourcing’, a strategy which seeks to engender interdependencies and cooperation between 
potentially mutually competitive suppliers. Triadic sourcing sees the buyer encouraging deep 
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interdependence during product development, sourcing, and through other mechanisms, e.g. using one 
another’s production capacity for similar products. The case study evidence suggests that triadic 
sourcing can provide efficiency, flexibility and innovation. 
 Apart from the substantive findings of these papers, it is also useful to reflect on the way in which 
the triadic form as such is brought into the studies (this is of particular relevance when we consider 
methodological issues in Section 5). In Choi et al. (2002), specific reference to triads is only made in 
the last few paragraphs: although the graphical representations of the archetypes show three firms, this 
seems to be used to represent the nature of relationships among multiple suppliers, however many 
there may be. Wu and Choi (2005), in contrast, adopt an explicitly triadic view from the outset. 
Nevertheless, data were collected on suppliers beyond the triad where necessary and, of their eight 
‘triad’ archetypes, two are described and represented as involving more than three firms. So, although 
triads are the central concept, making the data collection and analysis feasible and presentation more 
compelling, there is still some flexibility in the triadic framing of the work. Also, as noted, most of the 
propositions are concerned with the ensuing supplier-supplier relationships, rather than triadic 
phenomena, and the ‘naming’ of the archetypes (‘coach’, etc.) refers to the role of the buyer.  
 By the time we reach the conceptual study in Choi and Wu (2009c), however, the triadic 
formulation is more central: while still writing of the triad as ‘the next logical step’ after the dyad 
(which still suggests tractability rather than conceptual necessity as the motivator), the paper adopts a 
theory of balanced triads based on Heider (1946). Importantly for the later discussion on method, 
Choi and Wu (2009c) develop theory about triads (more specifically, about their balance): in contrast, 
prior work developed theory about dyads as affected by their existing in triads. Then, in Wu et al. 
(2010), the focus returns to the management of supplier-supplier relationships by buying firms (as in 
Wu and Choi (2005)) and, as in Choi et al. (2002), is rooted in the game-theoretic idea of ‘co-
opetition’.  
 Several triad studies, within the OM-SCM field, have thus focused on buyer-supplier-supplier 
triads. In addition to studies of buyer-supplier-supplier triads, there have been a few studies of other 
types of triads.  Bastl, Johnson and Choi (2013) make a distinction between two-tier and three-tier 
triads. Two-tier triads involve two actors who essentially perform the same role vis-à-vis the third 
actor, i.e. they involve two suppliers (as discussed above) or two customers. The OM-SCM literature 
does not encompass any specific studies on triads with two customers, but other management research 
disciplines do (see Appendix 1). 
 Three-tier triads involve actors that perform different roles in the overall supply ‘chain’. Typically, 
these latter types of triads involve an actor that is performing two different roles; a supplier role in 
relation to one actor, and a customer role in relation to the other actor. These three-tier triads are 
similar to our buyer-supplier-customer triads, and the OM-SCM literature contains just a few studies 
of such triads (in manufacturing). Mena et al. (2103) study power and relationship stability between 
customers, suppliers and second tier suppliers. One of the central propositions derived from their 
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exploratory studies is that a triad (i.e. a setting where the customer also has a direct relation with the 
second tier supplier) offers greater perceptions of stability, but that it also requires larger management 
effort. Rossetti and Choi (2008) investigate the process of disintermediation, where a supplier 
bypasses the buyer to directly serve a customer. Their study, in aircraft manufacturing, finds that 
supplier-buyer goal incongruence increases disintermediation.   
 Comparing the buyer-supplier-customer (BSC) service triad (Figure 1) and the buyer-supplier-
supplier (BSS) triad (Figure 2), there is one key difference. In the service triad, exchange is taking 
place between the supplier and the customer, not between the supplier(s) and the buyer. As a 
consequence, exchange in and the governance of the other relations is also different. We now turn to a 
specific discussion of service triads.  
 
2.2. Service triads 
 It is only relatively recently that service triads have been explicitly identified as an object of study. 
In contrast to manufacturing triads, as we have seen, service triads typically involve three distinct 
entities, i.e. a buyer, a supplier and a customer (as opposed to for example one buyer and two 
suppliers in a manufacturing context).  At this point, it is also worth noting that there may be multiple 
suppliers of services to a buyer, just as there are multiple supplier of components in ‘classic’ 
manufacturing triads. However, our specific interest here is in the buyer-supplier-customer triad, and 
any buyer may be involved in several of these. 
 Within the domain of service triads, Li and Choi (2009) focus on shifting relationship structures, 
and in particular on the position of the (services) buyer vis-à-vis that of the supplier and customer. In 
services outsourcing, the ‘bridge’ position of the buyer between supplier and customer, providing 
information and monitoring benefits, may decay as the supplier comes into direct contact or 
interaction with the customer, leading to erosion of those benefits. According to Li and Choi (2009), 
investing in communication with supplier and customer will yield information on how the supplier 
performs, curbing opportunistic behavior, and enabling the buyer to better control performance. 
 Finne and Holmström (2012) analyze the process where subsystem suppliers bypass system 
integrators (buyers) and directly build relations with customers. Their (single case) study 
demonstrates that the supplier’s service capabilities are contingent on access to the field service sites 
and installed base information, which require a relationship with the customer. Triadic cooperation 
between supplier, buyer and customer improves the value to the customer “by improving service 
quality and aligns the interests and capabilities of supplier and intermediary” (Finne and Holmström, 
2012: 30). 
 The suitability of different forms of contracts for the buyer-supplier and buyer-customer relation 
are examined by Van der Valk and Van Iwaarden (2011); then, Van Iwaarden and Van der Valk 
(2013) use the same type of triads to investigate the conditions for service delivery quality control in 
different phases (e.g. service design, service delivery). Similarly, Menor and Johnson (2012) elaborate 
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on various aspects of service quality and the different roles that service triad actors have in managing 
quality. Holma (2012) investigates the interpersonal interactions between a buyer (travel agent), 
customer (client) and suppliers (e.g. hotels) of travel services.  
 Others examine all or part of the service triad issue, but only implicitly. Axelsson, Van der Valk 
and Wynstra develop and test a typology of business services, which includes what they label 
‘component services’ – again, those services delivered directly to the end customer – but their focus is 
primarily on the management, by the buying firm, of its relationship with the supplier (see, for 
instance Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002, Van der Valk and Wynstra, 2012, Wynstra et al., 2006). In 
other words, the triad is implicit; the aim of the study is to inform the dyadic relationship between 
buyer and supplier. Balakrishnan et al. (2008) examine the circumstances under which buying firms 
should outsource ‘front-end’ services, i.e. those that are delivered by a supplier directly to the 
customer – in other words, the very scenario we outline above – but, although they use the service 
OM concept of customer contact (Chase, 1981) in relation to the supplier-customer link, they do not 
take any account of the customer-buyer link in the triad. Finally, Peng et al. (2010) use an explicitly 
triadic approach to study maintenance services, but do not develop insights specific to services.  
 In recent years, studies have also emerged that investigate the dynamics of triads that involve at 
least two actors from one and the same organization. Typical examples are studies of a supplier and 
two units within the buying organization: the purchasing department and the internal client. 
Especially, in the context of service procurement we see such (partly internal) triads being studied 
(Andersson-Cederholm and Gyimóthy, 2010, Tate et al., 2010).  
 Thus, by and large, the research on triads within OM-SCM has focused on quite a variety of triad 
structures, although the handful of studies that deal with service triads have investigated buyer-
supplier-customer triads. However, most service triad studies have focused on the process of 
relationship formation and dissolution in triads—much like most other management research on 
triads. Very few studies have dealt with typical OM and SCM phenomena in (service) triads, such as 
capacity management or quality control, with some (recent) exceptions. 
 
3. Triad studies in management research and the social sciences 
 So far we have examined work from OM-SCM. In this section, we briefly discuss work on triads 
from other areas of management and organization studies (see Appendix 1). We also provide a short 
review of theoretical approaches from the social sciences that have informed triad research. 
 
3.1. Triad research in management and organization studies  
 In the early 1990s, researchers from the so-called ‘Industrial Marketing and Purchasing’ (IMP) 
group were, to our knowledge, the first within management research to explicitly identify triads 
within business networks as an object of study (Havila, 1996, Havila and Sandström, 1993, Kardane 
and Salle, 1992, Laage-Hellman, 1989, Pardo and Salle, 1994, Smith and Laage-Hellman, 1992). The 
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IMP work was influenced by, among other things, Cook and Emerson’s (1984) analysis of exchange 
relationships (see below). Building on this foundation, Smith and Laage-Hellman (1992) argue that 
some form of data reduction is necessary to make it possible to analyze networks. As such, they take 
the triad as their building block for analyzing larger networks, and develop a typology of different 
transition patterns, exploring how a focal firm can seek to transform its relationships within a triadic 
structure.   
 Central to the network approach of the IMP Group is the proposition that relationships are not just 
an affair between two firms or actors, but that these relations are also affected by and affect the 
relations of several other actors (Anderson et al., 1994). The network model is voluntaristic rather 
than deterministic; firms can choose how to act, but the possibilities are determined by the often long-
lasting relations they have with specific customers, suppliers, competitors, producers of 
complementary goods, customers’ customers, etc. These relations also form the basis and means for 
change. The network approach has extensively studied such interdependencies with regard to the 
exchange process between actors, which we return to below. 
 Other management and organization studies specifically examining triads are rare. Madhavan et al. 
(2004) examine the circumstances under which a triad of three ‘co-opetitors’ will become transitive, 
i.e. each of the three members becomes directly connected to the others. They argue that there are two 
tendencies that affect the degree to which a triad is transitive: clustering, in which the triad is 
extended beyond three members without becoming transitive, so as to access a wider set of 
counterparts and their resources, and countering, where the triad becomes transitive so as to block the 
potential advantage of the one actor that is linked to the two others.  
 Lazzarini et al. (2008) examine a setting and associated questions very similar to those in the Choi-
Wu studies: the interaction between supplier-supplier and buyer-supplier links in the automotive 
sector. As is typical in the strategic management literature, these are described as ‘alliances’, even 
though they actually cover a wide range of forms and degrees of interaction. The study finds that 
stronger buyer-supplier links deter strong supplier-supplier links, but that this relationship depends on 
the level of technological uncertainty. This contextual variable might have implications for the study 
of service triads.  
 Finally, Wuyts et al. (2004) study complex product provision (computer networks). Most of their 
study focuses on (using the terminology adopted in the present paper) the relationships between 
buyer-supplier links and customer-buyer links, but they also consider the effect of supplier-customer 
links on customer-buyer links. However, the link between the customer and supplier is one of 
‘contact’ rather than one of exchange or service provision, and is seen mainly as a means of 
attenuating the risk of opportunistic behavior arising from strong ties between supplier and buyer.  
 In sum, although these studies do not treat service triads as we have defined them, they do 
introduce further parameters of interest, including the notion that triads are part of greater networks 
and represent a more manageable unit of analysis for their study. Further, while the associations 
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among firms are voluntary, triad dynamics are influenced by existing structures (e.g. the relative tie 
strength among the three actors), objectives (e.g. the desire to prevent opportunistic behavior) and 
environmental contingencies. In addition, support for the transitivity of triads was found, suggesting 
the tendency for each firm to have direct ties with the remaining two players in the triad. These 
parameters seem to be essential in the further study of triads.  
 
3.2. Triad theory from the social sciences 
 Triad and service triad research in OM-SCM has also been informed by a number of theoretical 
perspectives from outside management and organization studies. While these perspectives are 
concerned, above all, with the connections and relationships between entities, usually people, they 
have been adopted because they provide possible ways to think about the phenomena arising from the 
triadic form per se.  
 
3.2.1. Roles in interpersonal triads 
 Simmel, a sociologist and philosopher, studied many things, but here it is his work on triads in 
interpersonal relationships that is of immediate relevance (Simmel, 1950). He saw the shift from dyad 
to triad as a fundamental transformation, and identifies three possible roles for the ‘third member’ of a 
triad. First is the mediator, who acts impartially, quells conflict between the other two members, and 
perhaps ensures the triad’s continued existence. The second is the tertius gaudens, where a member of 
a triad exploits the position of being connected to the other two members, who are not connected 
directly to one another. The third is the ‘divide and rule’, where the third member deliberately 
foments conflict between the other two, in order to further his/her own interests.  
 
3.2.2. Balance theory 
 Balance theory is rooted in the psychology literature (Heider, 1946, 1958), and argues that 
individuals seek ‘cognitive consistency’ (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003: 42)4  in their relationships with 
others. More specifically, “people prefer balanced relationships; for example, they prefer their 
friendships to be reciprocated, and for their friends to be friends with each other” (Kilduff and Tsai, 
2003: 42). Davis (1963) formalizes these ideas in structural terms and develops a number of 
implications for inter-personal relationships within organizations. Balance theory has been adopted in 
a recent study of inter-organizational triads (Choi and Wu, 2009c), but it should be noted that the 
original conception and analysis of balance was all at the interpersonal level. It is also noteworthy 
that, in its final paragraph, Davis’ paper comments: 
“Despite the wide range of topics covered by the theory it is not advanced as a general 
theory of interpersonal relations but as a theory of one major component. It is suggested 
that a general theory of inter-personal relations must consider, in addition to balance, 
                                                          
4
 More generally, this section draws on Kilduff and Tsai (2003).   
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the exchange process and the effects of competition for scarce values.” (Davis, 1963: 
461) 
 
 Even for inter-personal relationships, then, it is acknowledged that other factors may override the 
desire for balance. Kilduff and Tsai (2003) further suggest that Larson’s widely-cited paper on dyadic 
relationships (Larson, 1992) reflects an extension of balance theory to the inter-organizational level. 
But it does not make any explicit link to the theory, nor does it extend its analysis beyond the dyadic 
level, an extension which is fundamental to balance theory in the social psychology literature. 
 
3.2.3. Social network theory 
 Social network theory is an obvious potential approach for studying triads, dealing as it does with 
the structure and patterns of interaction between actors in networks. Indeed, the work of Burt (2002) 
has directly informed service triad research by Li and Choi (2009). The social network literature is 
huge and, particularly since around 2000, growing exponentially (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011); a vast 
array of concepts and techniques have been developed. As such, no attempt will be made here to 
review the literature in detail. Rather, we will briefly examine some key ideas, and comment on their 
applicability and relevance. 
Social network theory has its origins in the study of patterns of interactions among individuals in 
social relations; indeed, the vast majority of existing research is concerned with the analysis at the 
inter-personal level. One of the most celebrated examples is Granovetter’s notion of the ‘strength of 
weak ties’ (Granovetter, 1973), which suggests that strong ties (e.g. close friendships) between 
individuals tend to result in connections with further similar people holding similar ideas and, hence, 
that weak ties (e.g. passing acquaintances) are more likely to lead to innovative ideas. A further 
influential scholar in management and organization studies is Burt (1992). He is noted, above all, for 
his work on structural holes, which are ‘gaps’ in connections between different social networks that 
offer opportunities for individuals who can bridge the gap and link the two otherwise disconnected 
networks together. According to Borgatti and Halgin (2011), Granovetter and Burt study similar 
issues but, whereas Granovetter’s emphasis is on the nature (strength/weakness) of the tie between 
individuals, Burt’s focus is on its very existence. Moreover, Burt portrays a more strategic and 
deliberate process of managing network position, whereas Granovetter’s view is more serendipitous.  
 It is clear that aspects of social network theory can be applied to inter-organizational analysis. One 
form of this is to study networks of individuals who span multiple organizations, in order to 
understand how these inter-personal networks may affect inter-organizational outcomes. It is quite a 
different perspective (although potentially related) to treat organizations themselves as the actors who 
form nodes in a network. Some aspects of social network analysis can be translated from the 
interpersonal level to the inter-organizational level – arguably, for example, structural concepts such 
as ‘structural holes’. Some, however, cannot: for example, the ways ties between actors are 
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characterized (e.g. ‘is a friend of’). In some cases these boil down to the fundamental capacities of the 
type of actors (human or non-human) being considered. As Borgatti and Halgin put it:  
“Of course, it should be noted that different kinds of nodes have different capabilities, 
which needs to be taken account of in generating the auxiliary theorizing that links 
model outcomes to such outcome variables as, say, performance or creativity. For 
example, when an individual hears two bits of information, he has a fighting chance of 
integrating them, but when a firm hears two bits of information, it may be different 
parts of the organization that house them, and the bits may never come together in the 
same space to be integrated.” (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011: 1177) 
 
 Borgatti and Li (Borgatti and Li, 2009) provide a full discussion of the applicability of social 
network analysis to supply chain management. By its very existence, the paper clearly indicates faith 
in the potential of this approach; at the same time, Borgatti and Li once again signal the need for 
caution in transposing properties of human beings, such as ‘cognitive dissonance’, to non-human 
entities such as firms.  
 
3.2.4. Triads in exchange relations 
 Cook and Emerson’s studies of exchange networks contrast in many ways with what has gone 
before in this section, one of which is especially relevant. That is, they define relationships as those 
involving commercial exchange, rather than mere interaction. This then provides a basis for the 
examination of indirect effects such as those of interest in triad studies: 
“Two exchange relations are connected to the extent that exchange in one relation is 
contingent, positively or negatively, upon exchange in the other relation.” (Cook and 
Emerson, 1984: 3)  
 
 Thus, we would not study relationships as strong or weak, trusting or adversarial, but narrow our 
focus down to whether (and perhaps to what extent) they entail commercial exchange (Easton and 
Araujo, 1992). This is particularly relevant for buyer-seller relationships between firms and so, not 
surprisingly, Cook and Emerson’s work provided an important basis for the IMP research stream, as 
introduced above (e.g. Anderson et al., 1994).  
 In service triad studies, then, adopting Cook and Emerson’s focus on exchange, we should at least 
make it explicit to which extent each of the triadic relations involve commercial exchange. For 
instance, does the buyer contract with and pay the supplier? Or are the services paid for directly by the 
customer, and does the buyer only pre-select (provide a license to) the suppliers? Understanding such 
details of the exchange relationships helps understand the connections between relations, and the 
relative positions of the actors in the triad.  
 
3.2.5 A cautionary note on theory adoption 
 A common theme of the theoretical perspectives discussed is that much of the theory adopted in 
the triad work is taken from disciplines concerned with interpersonal relationships, rather than inter-
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organizational relationships. However, these theories can provide valuable insights for triad research, 
especially into both structural and processual issues arising from the triadic form as such. For 
example, Simmel’s work focused on the different roles taken on by the third member in a triad, which 
may be able to influence and thus explain exchange dynamics. Balance theory emphasizes cognitive 
consistency among partners, but also acknowledges contingencies (e.g. the exchange process, 
competition) that may influence the desire for balance in triads. Social network theory with its 
concepts of strength of weak ties and structural holes further seems promising for triad research. An 
additional dimension to be considered includes whether triad relationships include commercial 
exchange, rather than mere interaction.  
 Overall, while these theoretical perspectives are able to inform triad research, there is also a 
potential danger in anthropomorphizing organizations when transferring theory between the domains. 
Similar cautionary advice has been provided concerning such conceptions as ‘organizational learning’ 
(Araujo, 1998). Scholars applying these theoretical perspectives, which are inherently grounded in the 
interpersonal domain, to inter-organizational contexts within triad research, are therefore cautioned to 
note this potential mismatch, and to apply utmost precision in applying the theoretical notions from 
above to the environment under study. In addition, influential contingencies that may weaken and 
strengthen the ability to apply above theoretical perspectives need to be considered; different 
exchange contexts may demand a combination of theories or an adaptation of the theory to the studied 
environment.  
 
4. Features and forms of service triads 
 Having delineated the nature of and existing research on service triads, as well as some informing 
theory, in this section we examine more closely some of the specific issues that arise from the service 
triad form. 
 
4.1. Distinctive features of service triads 
In manufacturing supply chains, a component supplier might interact with its customer’s customer, 
but it does not always need to (Figure 3a). And, as in the Choi-Wu studies, supplier-supplier 
interactions in a potential triad may or may not take place (Figure 2). However, in a service triad, the 
supplier has to have direct contact with the customer (Figure 3b). Hence, there is a fundamental 
difference because of the service-based nature of the process and that, at least at the level of the 
operations process, makes the service triad cohere as a triad. In keeping with this view, Li and Choi 
(2009) draw on the notion of customer contact (Chase, 1981) as a distinguishing characteristic of 
services, primarily to demarcate the type of services they wish to study – those involving high 






Figure 3. Comparing buyer-supplier-customer relationships in manufacturing and service  
 
 
 Furthermore, it is worth recalling that the key task in OM-SCM is to design and manage operations 
and supply chains to satisfy particular customers with particular products and services, and to achieve 
certain performance priorities (e.g. Hayes and Wheelwright, 1979, Fisher, 1997). The Choi-Wu 
studies of supplier-supplier relationships have focused relentlessly upstream, with a view to informing 
theory and managerial prescription about how firms should manage upstream supply networks (see 
also Choi et al., 2001), to satisfy the eventual customer. Hence, they study triads implicitly in relation 
to the customer (Figure 4a), but the customer is not part of the triad. Service triads, in contrast, 
incorporate the customer as a member of the triad (Figure 4b): in Sampson’s terms, the customer is 
also a supplier (Sampson, 2000) and, hence, designing and managing the supply network (triad) to 
satisfy the customer, in part, involves managing that same customer’s input to and participation in the 
co-production of the service it pays to receive.  
 The definition of services, then, becomes important here. Recent developments in both OM and 
marketing have seen the so-called ‘IHIP’ characteristics (intangibility, heterogeneity, inseparability, 
perishability (Sasser et al., 1978, Nie and Kellogg, 1999)) become less widely accepted as a basis for 
distinguishing between services and products (Lovelock and Gummesson, 2004, Vargo and Lusch, 
2004). In their place are two related alternatives. Sampson’s unified service theory (UST) is based on 
defining services as processes to which customers provide significant inputs (Sampson and Froehle, 
2006). A second approach, which also hinges on the roles of the respective parties, but is more 
concerned with ownership of assets than with processes, is what Lovelock and Gummesson term the 
‘rental/access paradigm’, and Spring and Araujo (2009) explain in terms of Coase’s notion of the 
‘institutions of production’ (Coase, 1992). Both stress that a service cannot be divorced from an 





Figure 4. The customer’s relationship to the triad 
 
  
 An illustrative example may help in exploring these issues. Suppose a truck manufacturer 
outsources field maintenance of its customers’ trucks to a network of third-party maintenance 
companies. A UST approach would emphasize the importance of the end customer’s input into the 
third-party company’s delivery of the maintenance service – by making the truck available and 
providing information allowing diagnosis and repair, perhaps.  
Notice that the customer’s role as supplier is potentially split: it might provide some inputs to the 
buying firm and some to the supplier (Sampson and Spring, 2011). As a consequence, the buying firm 
may also need to take up a supplier role and provide (i.e. transform and forward) inputs to the 
supplier
5
. In the triadic setting, this would raise questions about how the buying firm should manage 
this interactive process: should it obtain diagnostic information from the customer to pass to the 
maintenance provider, and schedule the maintenance interaction, or should it simply allocate 
customers to maintenance providers at the outset and then leave all the details to the other two parties 
to arrange between themselves?  The latter scenario may, in the short run, be more efficient for the 
buying firm, but it may threaten its position to create and claim any value-add in the long run. 
 The rental/access or institutional approach, in contrast, would emphasize the fact that the third-
party maintenance company is acting to change the state of something owned by another party 
(Gadrey, 2000), which has implications for incentives and for the definition of the respective rights 
                                                          
5
 In other situations, this supplier role of the buying firm vis-à-vis the supplier is inherently there. Think, for 
instance, of a situation where a public transport provider outsources cleaning services (of its stations and trains) 
to external providers. The transport provider will need to manage the adequate supply of inputs (e.g. in terms of 
volume, timing, location of trains). 
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and responsibilities. In the triad, questions are raised as to how closely the buying firm should define 
those roles and responsibilities, as opposed to the maintenance provider. An additional element is 
introduced when, as is common in this sector, the asset (truck) is not sold to the customer, but is 
retained in the ownership of the manufacturer as part of a ‘servitized’ offering. This would give rise to 
increasingly fragmented rights and responsibilities: the manufacturer owns the truck, the end-user 
uses it, but the maintenance firm repairs it. 
 In sum, adopting the UST perspective, a unique feature of service triads is that the inputs for the 
service process may actually be provided in each of the three relations; the customer may provide 
inputs both to the supplier and to the buying firm, and the buying firm may provide inputs to the 
supplier. In adopting the institutional approach, this feature finds its corollary in the fragmented rights 
and responsibilities between the three actors. 
 We posit that existing service triad research has not fully leveraged these unique features of service 
triads. In moving the triad research on to consider service triads, Li and Choi (2009) identify as the 
key focus of their study the emphasis on the process of outsourcing. This process dimension, 
however, does not appear to be distinctive for service outsourcing compared to outsourcing 
manufacturing tasks, whereas the issues arising from the very nature of services are distinctive. 
 
4.2. Forms of service triads 
 There appear to be three main forms of service triads: buyer-initiated triads, customer-initiated 
triads and supplier-initiated triads (see Table 1). Buyer-initiated triads have their origin in a sourcing 
or outsourcing decision by the buying firm: for instance, an equipment manufacturer that decides to 
outsource to a third party the field maintenance of equipment that is operated by its customers, as 
above. In buyer-initiated triads, the buyer is initially the ‘tertius iungens’ – the actor who brokers the 
connection between others (Li and Choi, 2009).  
 Customer-initiated triads have their origin in a decision by the customer to use a third party to 
mediate and/or support the exchange with a supplier. Imagine, for instance, a customer that uses a 
project management firm to coordinate and monitor a contractor (or several contractors) that delivers 
construction work services for a new factory or office building for the customer. Another example 
from the B2B purchasing domain includes the customer contracting with market-making 
intermediaries that aid the customer in its purchasing decision, for instance by identifying qualified 
suppliers and conducting negotiations with them.  
 Finally, supplier-initiated triads have their origin in a decision by the supplier to use a third party 
to mediate and/or support the exchange with the customer. For instance, an independent truck driver 
decides to work for a logistics service provider (the buyer), and is during ‘service delivery’ obviously 
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Table 1. Comparing main types of service triads. 
 
 As Table 1 describes, not only the initiating actor may vary – also the actor providing the focal 
service and the users of this service. In buyer-initiated service triads, not only the customer but also 
the buyer benefits from the service; for instance, the assets that the buyer uses to service the customer 
are in a better condition (outsourced cleaning of public transportation). In triads initiated by the 
customer or the supplier, in contrast, it is typically the supplier (besides the customer) that benefits 
from the service. Many of these types of triads encompass a supplier getting support from the buyer in 
accessing and dealing with customers. 
 As one can deduce from Table 1, buyer-initiated and supplier-initiated triads are quite similar, 
essentially because in both forms the primary service exchange is between the supplier and the 
customer. The two types of triads are also similar in terms of the contracts that are most likely to be in 
place; between the supplier and the buyer, and between the buyer and the customer (see Figure 3b). In 
some situations, there may also be a supplier-customer contract, for instance if a customer can select a 
supplier (from a range that the buyer offers). Thus, each of the dyadic relations in buyer-initiated and 
supplier-initiated triads involves either a contractual relation and/or a service exchange relation. As 
discussed, Madhavan et al.(2004) refers to such triads as transitive, meaning that all three actors have 
direct ties with each other. 
 In the case of customer-initiated triads, where the primary service exchange is between the buyer 
and the customer, contracts seem most likely for the customer-buyer relation and the customer-
supplier relation. If there are also contracts in place, or service exchange, between the buyer and 
supplier, this type of triad would also be transitive. 
 While this comparison is only a first, somewhat schematic description, it does highlight the 
importance of specifying the particular triad structure and between whom (exchange) relationships 
exist, as this will have bearing on the specific interdependencies and OM-SCM processes that will be 
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affected by the triad context. Indeed, the presence or absence of contractual relationships and/or 
service process interactions in each link of the triad will determine the objects of enquiry and the 
theoretical perspectives used to study service triad phenomena. 
  
5. Extending service triad research: an agenda 
 We see many ways in which the service triad field can be extended as a domain of research. In this 
section, we seek to identify some dimensions of this extension. First, we discuss some specific topics 
for service triad research, focusing on OM-SCM related themes. Second, we examine how theoretical 
approaches from outside and within OM-SCM could help inform alternative research avenues. 
Finally, we consider the methodological implications arising from the nature of triads. 
  
5.1. Service triad research topics 
 Below is an overview of topics that we believe hold potential for further research on service triads.  
As argued before, we propose that OM-SCM research on service triads would best be developed 
further by focusing on OM-SCM themes within triads, rather than identifying interorganizational 
triads of different supply chain actors and then investigating the classical triad phenomena of the 
changing positions and roles of the triad actors.  
 The following overview is not intended as an exhaustive list, but it can serve as a starting point and 
hopefully provide guidance for researchers interested in other OM-SCM topics to analyze whether 
and how these could be leveraged within a service triad context. The particular selection of topics 
raised here has been inspired, partly, by some of our own (ongoing) empirical research, and partly by 
classical (service) operations and supply chain management research themes (Roth and Menor, 2003). 
Our suggested topics are in line with the priority themes for research on service networks and value 
chains, as identified in Ostrom et al. (2010): outsourcing and interorganizational service network 
collaboration (globally) to enhance service productivity and success; pricing mechanisms to share 
gains and losses across a service system; and managing upstream and downstream migration in the 
service value chain.  
  
5.1.1. Capacity management 
Many service triads involve a buying firm using a specialist provider of ‘generic’ services, say, 
call center services. Part of the advantage of this arrangement is that the supplier can pool risk by 
providing similar services for multiple buying firms and, therefore, to multiple constituencies of end 
customers. This also enables the supplier to competitively price its services to buyers. However, the 
supplier has to make decisions about the extent to which staff and processes will be generic and 
interchangeable between their various customers (maximizing risk-pooling benefits), rather than 
dedicated to each customer (losing risk-pooling but increasing focus on the end customer group). 
Hence, an ensuing interesting research question is how much customization of service offerings is 
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optimal in service triads, so as to satisfy the buyer and the customer, while  minimizing the cost for 
the supplier (with these cost savings passed on to the buyer). Further, how can the supplier’s capacity 
management be optimized by soliciting input not only from the buyer (who usually provides capacity 
forecasts), but also from the customer? Within that vein, a question of interest may also be whether 
and how a supplier, which is part of multiple triads, can leverage its position for efficiencies, 
potentially also for the benefit of the buyers, who might work together in a co-opetitive framework to 
further enhance global network performance. 
 
5.1.2. Risk  
The increased bundling of products and services in service delivery systems, the long-term nature 
of outsourcing relationships, and the fact that outsourced services are often component services, 
customized for and delivered directly to the buyer’s customer, is reflected in the growing 
infrastructural and performance complexity of these services (Lewis and Roehrich, 2011). Complexity 
in terms of infrastructure (ongoing customization, e.g. in terms of timing) and performance 
(difficulties of assessing and attributing outcomes) can be seen to vary in relation to the type of 
service being procured. Component services are located at the high end of this complexity spectrum. 
With this growing complexity and impact of component services on buyer’s core business and its final 
offering to the customer, risk is thus becoming a major concern in outsourcing services (Metters, 
2008, Van der Valk et al., 2009, Wynstra et al., 2006). 
Studies of risk in supply chain management tended to focus on the identification and mitigation of 
risks that arise due to factors external to the supply chain (e.g. transportation strikes, terrorism). While 
these are relevant in service triads, too, a more fundamental question concerns the extent to which, 
and the ways in which, risks arise from the very structural and dynamic properties of the triadic 
arrangement. To some extent, risk can be seen as a consequence of other issues we discuss here: 
perverse incentives in contracts can give rise to undesirable supplier behavior with potential for 
disproportionately adverse outcomes; poorly understood capabilities can give rise to service quality 
shortcomings and lost reputation for the buying firm.  
With respect to risk management, particular attention could be devoted to triadic relationships that 
are only incidentally mobilized. Most studies have been concerned with ongoing ‘bread-and butter’ 
activities and how they can be accommodated in a triadic structure. Further study is therefore needed 
into triads that are only called into operation in extreme situations, such as the management and the 
mitigation of potential disasters (e.g. the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico). Exciting research 
questions in this realm include how buyers manage the risk associated with outsourcing service 
activities to a supplier, with the supplier oftentimes being perceived, by the customer, to be same 
organization as the buyer. For example, what safeguards are in place, and at what point might it make 




5.1.3. Service provider identity and branding 
Buying firms who put their suppliers ‘face-to-face’ with their end customers have to manage the 
dynamics of the relationship, as shown by Li and Choi (2009). An interesting perspective on this 
comes from recent studies of branding and identity in supply chains (Duguid, 2010). Although 
associated more frequently with consumer markets, brands are important in business markets too, 
arguably particularly so when complex services are being bought and brand and reputation become 
important proxies for direct understanding by customers and buying firms alike of the quality of the 
offering. Duguid’s work shows how the location of the most important brands in certain industries 
shifts over time: one example in the manufacturing industry he explores is the concerted effort Intel 
made, through the ‘Intel Inside’ campaign, to ensure that their brand was as prominent as that of the 
PC assembler’s.  
Bringing this back to our immediate concern, management by the buying firm of the brands of the 
respective suppliers is a critical area in delivering a coherent experience to the end customer. For 
instance, a Dutch insurance company has been collaborating with a supplier of emergency medical 
and roadside assistance services to develop a smartphone application by which insurance policy 
holders can call in for assistance. As the insurance company wants to leverage these rare moments for 
promoting its own brand, an essential element has been the branding of the app.  
We posit that service triad research offers fruitful opportunities to extend the work of Duguid and 
others on branding. Under what conditions, for instance, does branding by the buying organization of 
the supplier’s service help to create a coherent identity of the buying organization’s value offerings to 
customers? Are services that are quite distant from the buying organization’s core offering better 
offered under the supplier’s brand, or co-branded by supplier and buyer? Does it matter in this context 
whether the supplier operates under its own brand in other buyer-supplier-customer triads? Within all 
of this, how does the relative brand perception of buyer vs. supplier come into play, especially in 
instances when the brand perception of the supplier is higher than that of the buyer? 
 
5.1.4. Capabilities 
The resource-based view and capabilities perspectives have increasingly been drawn on to explain 
the boundaries of firm activities in operations and supply chain management (e.g. Holcomb and Hitt, 
2007). The buying firm in a service triad is able to deliver value to its customer by virtue of its own 
capabilities, and yet for significant elements of the total offering delivered to its customer, it is 
providing the means for its customer to access the capabilities of its supplier, the third party in the 
triad. While the buying firm may lack the ‘zero-level’ capabilities (Winter, 2003) to carry out the 
service, it does need to have indirect capabilities (Loasby, 1998) so that it can understand and specify 
the service adequately, taking into account the (technical) requirements of the customer. Studies of the 
practice of indirect capabilities are rare (although see Spring and Araujo, 2014), but buying firms in 
service triads must have significant skills in translating between customer and supplier, and 
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orchestrating (Hagel and Brown, 2005) possibly multiple third-parties (e.g. consider various 
component services provided by an airport operator and its passenger customers). One study in point 
is Parker and Anderson’s (2002) investigation of the capabilities required by HP’s engineers as they 
moved into systems integration rather than direct design and production.   
With the growing trend towards offering combined product and service systems, buying 
organizations need to build relations with service suppliers that are increasingly distant from their 
own core business. Take for instance Volvo Buses, which now needs to build relations with real-estate 
agents, as well as training and recruitment providers in Asia, to be able to offer complete mobility 
solutions – including not only buses, but also garage space and trained drivers – to its customers in 
public transportation. 
Service triads set interesting contexts for further studies of indirect capabilities, at buying firms in 
particular, as they can highlight the role that these capabilities have for the position of the buying firm 
vis-à-vis the customer as well. Some potential research questions include the following: what is the 
optimal level of expertise in indirect capabilities from the buyer’s perspective? How can indirect 
capabilities be effectively translated to the supplier? At what point does it make sense to develop 
these indirect capabilities further and take the service delivery in-house?  
 
5.1.5. Contracting in triads  
One topic that has rarely been studied in the context of inter-organizational service triads relates to 
the definition, selection and use of contracts. Organizational theories, in particular agency theory and 
management control theory, identify two main alternative contract forms: behavior-based contracts 
and outcome-based contracts (Eisenhardt, 1989, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Ouchi, 1992). Recently, 
there has been an increasing interest in outcome-based or ‘performance-based’ contracts, both in 
practice and the academic literature (Heinrich and Choi, 2007, Hypko et al., 2010). Traditional 
management control and agency literature, however, has focused on the context of a dyadic buyer-
supplier relationship. Little or no research has been done on performance-based contracting in triadic 
relations, where a buyer contracts with a supplier to deliver services to the buyer’s customers 
(Niranjan and Metri, 2008, Li and Choi, 2009). Co-aligning the interests of buyer, supplier and 
buyer’s customer in performance-based contracts within such triads creates challenges in specifying 
and controlling performance. 
For instance, managing information flows, either to assess behavior or to measure outcomes, 
becomes a greater challenge to the buying organization (Li and Choi, 2009). Service triads would thus 
also provide interesting settings to study, for instance, the complementarity or substitution effects of 
contractual and relational governance (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). From a performance-based 
perspective, it would also be interesting to explore how a supplier may deliver unique insights derived 
from the interactions with the buyer’s customers. Drawing parallels to the manufacturing context, a 
supplier may be able to provide more to the buyer than the mere fulfillment of the service obligations 
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to the buyer’s customer. Due to the supplier’s interaction with the customers, it may gain valuable 
intelligence that could help improve the buyer’s performance (e.g. unsolicited feedback and 
suggestions the supplier receives from the buyer’s customers).  
 
5.2. Theoretical perspectives from management and organization 
 As in other areas of OM-SCM, service triad research can potentially be strengthened and 
stimulated by the use of theory from the wider discipline of management and organization studies. 
Some theories, such as transaction costs economics (TCE) and the resource-based-view (RBV), have 
become quite widely used in OM-SCM. Some additional theoretical perspectives suggest themselves 
because of the inter-organizational nature of the triad. Appendix 2 includes a set of theoretical 
perspectives that may be especially fruitful in their application to service triad research. The selection 
is derived from our analysis of prior studies on triads (Appendix 1), and the authors’ complementary 
research backgrounds (respectively in service procurement, service operations and supply chain 
management). Appendix 2 briefly outlines some of the main concepts of the respective theories, as 
well as how these can be applied to the study of service triads.  
The highlighted theories can also help inform some of the research themes identified above. For 
example, since a supplier depends on the buyer for accurate forecasts to enable efficient capacity 
management, reciprocal dependence exists between the parties, offering resource dependence theory 
as a feasible perspective. Similarly, the sharing of information for optimized capacity management 
can be informed by social network theory, based on which information is passed back and forth 
between the supplier and the buyer to develop a well-informed capacity plan. Having such a plan in 
place will lower the risk and cost to the supplier, with the buyer then ideally also receiving the results 
of these efficiencies in terms of price reductions.  
The topic of risk management in service triads can be informed by agency theory, which may help 
stipulate contractual safeguards to minimize the buyer’s risk of being represented by a third party to 
its customers. Along similar lines, transaction cost economics may be applied to assess whether a 
triadic structure is most economical (where the service is outsourced, with however the potential for 
lack of control and thus risk) or a setting where the service is taken back in-house, which may be 
more expensive, but which may reduce some of the risks of having an independent party perform the 
service.  
Branding and service identity in service triads could be studied from an RBV perspective, where a 
buyer strategically contracts with a supplier to deliver the service to the customer, due to the 
supplier’s brand reputation. In this instance, this reputation could be classified as a resource, able to 
differentiate the buyer’s overall offering to the customer. Similarly, the theory of performance 
frontiers may help explain the buyer’s rationale for contracting with a highly reputable supplier, so as 
to enhance the overall value of the offering delivered to the customer, thus pushing performance 
frontiers outward; this might not have been possible only with the buyer’s own resources.  
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The topic of capabilities can certainly be studied with the resource- or knowledge-based view of 
the firm, with supplier capabilities representing valuable resources that can be leveraged by the buyer. 
The application of TCE also seems promising, since the buyer may need to weigh off whether to have 
the supplier perform the services (and pay the appropriate service fees), or provide the services itself 
(which might be more economical in some instances, given the costs of developing and maintaining 
indirect capabilities, as well as their translation to the supplier).  
Agency theory has immediate relevance for the study of contracting in triads, due to its focus on 
structuring arrangements between entities. Developing appropriate contracts may also be guided by 
the objective to minimize transaction costs, making TCE a potential framework. Contracting may 
further bring structure into dependence relationships, thus offering certainty and predictability to 
important relationships; RDT might therefore also be a feasible foundation. 
We have focused this review on the theories that we see as offering the most potential, but the list 
could be extended to include, for example, capabilities (Loasby, 1998), organizational routines 
(Feldman and Pentland, 2003), actor-network theory (Latour, 2005), institutional theory (Scott, 1995), 
power (Clegg et al., 2006), organization design (Srikanth and Puranam, 2010), modularity (Baldwin, 
2008) and identity (Gioia et al., 2000), among many others. Beyond the management literature, since 
service triads often involve extremes of spatial proximity and distance in service delivery, economic 
geography can also provide interesting insights (Learner and Storper, 2001, Gertler, 2003).  
 
5.3. Method, theory and the unit of analysis 
 Triads in general, and service triads in particular, present special methodological challenges. These 
concern the links between the theory used, the unit of observation, and the unit of analysis, among 
others. There is an inherent interdependency between theory and method (Van Maanen et al., 2007, 
Dubois and Araujo, 2007) in any organizational research, and as we shift our concern from firms to 
dyads and then triads, this also has implications for the unit of analysis. Many critical insights - for 
theory and practice - can only be made by changing the unit of analysis, from firm, to dyad and, then, 
to triad and the extended chain.   
 Some years ago, Choi and Wu issued a ‘call to arms’ (2008, 2009b), exhorting operations 
researchers to ‘take the leap’ and study triads rather than buyer-supplier dyads. Different perspectives 
on the relationship between triads and larger networks led to an exchange between Dubois, and Choi 
and Wu in The Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management (Choi and Wu, 2009a, 2009b, Dubois, 
2009). Dubois’ view, in sum, was that triads are merely an arbitrary subset of larger networks, and 
that the effect of these networks on firms and dyads can never be escaped (see also Laage-Hellman 
(1989) and Cova et al. (2010)). Choi and Wu’s position is broadly that triads are a distinctive and 
worthwhile object of investigation in their own right.  
 In a sense, this tension has run through the various triad studies, as the centrality of the triadic form 
to the respective studies has waxed and waned, often being more central or essential on account of the 
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theoretical perspective being adopted rather than because of any incontrovertible empirical evidence 
that triadic phenomena have overwhelming explanatory power. The social network theorist 
Krackhardt summarizes and quotes the seminal theorist of inter-personal triads, Simmel, as follows: 
“The difference between a dyad and a triad, however, was fundamental [for Simmel]. 
Adding a third party to a dyad ‘completely changes them, but … the further expansion 
to four or more persons by no means correspondingly modifies the group any further’ 
(Simmel, 1950: 138).” (Krackhardt, 1999: 186) 
 
 Part of the Choi/Wu-Dubois debate, then, is about whether the shift to triads is indeed 
fundamental; but Dubois’s point is also that, in practice, one can never bound a group of firms – 
whether we choose to examine a dyad or a triad, it will always be connected to and interact with a 
wider network. Choi and Wu’s response (Choi and Wu, 2009a) draws on their conception of supply 
networks as complex adaptive systems (Choi et al., 2001), arguing that, while the wider network may 
exhibit emergent properties that will always manifest beyond the triadic level, when it comes to 
interventions to control the network, the triad can indeed be a powerful unit of analysis and action. 
 Thus, it is not difficult to see that ‘making the leap from dyads to triads’ (Choi and Wu, 2009b) is, 
indeed, a big leap in terms of complexity – if only in terms of data collection. To this we can add 
some of the practical reality of most organizational research. Survey methods typically collect data 
from samples of a population of a particular class of firms: in service triads, this might mean firms 
who are outsourcing their call center operations, for example. It is usually very difficult to collect data 
from the exact counterpart service providers, although data could be collected from a sample of the 
population of service providers, and so on. Hence, it is unlikely that reciprocal data could be collected 
from all the participants in a particular triad (but see Wu et al. (2010) for an instance where this was 
achieved). 
 Notice here the interrelationships between phenomenon, the unit of analysis and the theory (both 
the theory driving the inquiry and the theory that it gives rise to). A relationship is clearly only 
possible when more than two entities (people or firms) are involved – it is meaningless to speak of a 
person’s relationship as such, it must be its relationship with another; one might then use phenomena 
observed in a relationship to develop theory about relationships (e.g. weak ties promote radical 
innovation), or about the entities (e.g. buying firms should maintain arm’s length relationships for 
some kinds of purchased item). Some theories are intrinsically about firms – most obviously, the 
resource-based view of the firm – but can be used to understand inter-firm issues as, for example, in 
Holcomb and Hitt (2007) and Dyer and Singh (1998). It could readily be argued that the resource-
based view is inherently relational to some extent anyway, as most of Barney’s (1991) VRIN criteria 
are implicitly about other firms: valuable (i.e. to other firms), rare (i.e. other firms do not have them), 
inimitable (i.e. by other firms) and non-substitutable (i.e. with resources from other firms). Some IMP 
writers see the combining of inter-organizational resource as a central issue (Baraldi et al., 2012).  
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 Figure 5 is an attempt to draw together the elements of the research agenda we have discussed. 
Overall, it shows the notion of ‘theory-driven’ research, with an intent to study particular phenomena 
(service triads), taking explicit account of their defining characteristics, and stimulated by the use of 
one or more theoretical lenses, perhaps from organizational and operations management origins, 
perhaps from theories about inter-personal relationships. Data collection will likely be through units 
of observation at the individual manager or firm level. Nevertheless, there will be an attempt to 
develop insights about triadic phenomena. Theory development might then concern firms, dyads, 
triads or, returning to the Choi/Wu-Dubois debate above, the triadic study might be a stepping-stone 





Figure 5. Service triad theory-building 
 
6. The papers in the special issue 
 In total, there are three additional papers in this special issue—resulting from an initial set of 26 
submissions. 
 Modi, Wiles and Mishra examine the consequences for the buyer of service failure by the supplier 
in service triads. More specifically, they use event study methods to examine the implications of 
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customer information security breaches by the supplier. Their study uses service failure and service 
recovery frameworks, underpinned by social exchange theory, to demonstrate that service failures due 
to the third party supplier – so-called ‘triadic breaches’ – lead to greater shareholder losses than 
breaches due to the buyer, i.e. ‘dyadic breaches’. They also hypothesize that buyers with greater 
employee productivity, and greater financial resources, are better able to mitigate the effects of triadic 
breaches. They find that, indeed, employee productivity does have such a mitigating effect, but that 
financial resources do not. This study, rooted in the core operations management concept of service 
recovery, has important theoretical and practical implications regarding the potential risks associated 
with outsourcing ‘front-end’ or component services. 
 Wuyts, Rindfleisch and Citrin consider the outsourcing of customer support services, and focus on 
the triadic setting where an outsourcing provider (supplier) serves end customers on behalf of its 
clients (buyers). Applying a Motivation-Opportunity-Ability framework, the authors hypothesize 
about effects moderating the relationship between provider customer focus and customer need 
fulfillment. Contingency variables considered include the relational tie between the client and the 
provider, the customer focus of the client, and market turbulence. The hypotheses are tested with data 
from 171 outsourcing clients in the Netherlands, with validation provided by a sample of 135 Indian 
outsourcing providers. The results provide insight under which conditions provider customer focus 
more strongly influences customer need fulfillment.  
 Zhang, Lawrence and Anderson explore one special type of service triad, the franchise triad. This 
triad can also be seen as a buyer-supplier-customer triad, where the franchisee is the supplier, and the 
franchisor, as buyer, has outsourced the core, ‘front office’ service operations to this supplier. 
Applying Agency Theory, this paper examines the inherent conflict of interests between a principal 
(i.e., franchisor) that controls brand equity as a shared resource and an agent (i.e., franchisee) that 
retains pricing rights and profits, by interacting directly with customers. The results demonstrate that 
franchisees charge higher prices than their corporate counterparts even when controlling for 
operational performance. The findings suggest that the triad structure plays a significant role in 
franchisees’ ability to free-ride on shared brand equity and hold important managerial implications for 
effective outsourcing and contract design. The study also provides an interesting perspective on the 
issue of service provider identity and branding in triads, a topic proposed under our research agenda 
(section 5). 
 Together, these contributions span a variety of theoretical frameworks for studying service triads. 
A common element across all three papers, is that they all focus on the potential risks associated with 
outsourcing ‘front-end’ or component services. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 In this lead article, we defined service triads, both as a phenomenon and a research topic. We 
provided a review of different strands of existing research and various theoretical frameworks that can 
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inform our study of service triads, culminating in an outline of a research agenda that can guide future 
study. The intention of this lead article was thus not only to introduce the articles in the special issue, 
but also to serve as a point of reference and motivation for further work on service triads, and on 
triads in general. 
 Our review culminates in a research agenda, discussed in section 5. Together with these proposed 
topics, theories and methods, we want to advance three broader recommendations. First, we 
encourage further development and testing of theories that are finer-grained, and that go beyond 
analyzing and explaining relationship dynamics within triads. Second, and closely related to the first 
point, rather than just extending theories of triads, we would suggest to extend theories in triads. In 
other words, to extend theories dealing with organizational, or dyadic phenomena, to the triadic 
context.  
 Thirdly, we suggest extending the number of empirical studies on triads. As noted earlier, triadic 
studies particularly within OM-SCM (Choi and Wu, 2009b), but also in management research in 
general (Madhavan et al., 2004), tend to be conceptual in nature. In pursuing such empirical studies, 
we encourage the application of a more advanced repertoire of research methods for the study of 
triads than is typically the case so far. 
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Roles, positions and relations 
among participants are continuously 
(re)deﬁned in a situated social 
reality. 









by weaker actors 




NA NA Propositions on coalition formation, 
for the three archetypes of triads, and 
four coalition conditions under each 
of these. 
3. Bjørnevik-
Aune et al. 
(2013) 
IMP C/S/S Activation of third 







Manufacturing Three main forms of ‘triadic’ 
supplier development: indirect and 
peripheral; direct and central; direct 
and networking. 







Promotion of the 
study of triads; 
overview of triadic 




Conceptual NA NA Argues for triads as the fundamental 
building blocks of networks; call for 
more triadic research.  




C/S/S Identification of 
nine archetypes of 
C/S/S triads in 





Conceptual NA NA Develops propositions how the 
adversarial or cooperative nature of 
relationships within the triad will 
have an effect on the other triad 
relations, given the state of the triad: 
stable/balanced, 
unstable/unbalanced, or including a 
structural hole. 




C/S/S Examines three 
archetypes of S-S 
relationships 
Development of 
a theory of S-S 
relationships  
Conceptual  NA Manufacturing Illustrates the strategic role of the 
buying firm in structuring S-S 
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managerial implications of different 





 Discussion of the 
study of triads; 
overview of triadic 





Conceptual NA NA  Argues for the study of triads mainly 
as a methodological tool; delineation 
of triads versus surrounding network 
is often arbitrary. 













Empirical  Multiple case 
study 
Manufacturing Triadic sourcing contributes to the 
efficiency and innovation of the 
buyer and the two suppliers. 







S/B/C Possibilities for 
subsystem 
suppliers to 
‘servitize’ within a 
supply chain, in 
which the end user 
relationship is 









Case study Both  
manufacturing 
and services 
Presents a decision-making 
procedure for subsystem suppliers, 
opting for cooperation in the service 
supply chain, to formulate a coherent 
set of triadic models with 
intermediaries and end users. 






through the lens of 









NA Services  Three triadic scenarios are identified 
(diamond, aligned unitary, timer); 
how the roles played within the 
frame of a triad changes by the 
activity task, the counterparts and 
time. 
11. Havila et al. 
(2004) 
IMP S/B/C Trust and 
commitment are 
used to study 





Empirical Survey Manufacturing A stronger interaction between the 
customer and the buyer weakens the 
interaction between the customer and 
the supplier; the customer-buyer 
relationship influences trust, while 












Empirical Case study Services 
(travel) 
Interpersonal interaction takes on 






capital customer changes the buyer due to 










Introduces triads as 
a first step to 










Technological development requires 
mobilization and coordination of 
resources and activities of different 
actors; focus on triad is primarily a 
methodological choice, to help 
bridge IMP’s subsequent interaction 















Service Conceptual NA Services 
(consultancy, 
legal etc.) 
Suggests alternative levels of 
analysis: interpersonal ‘micro’ triad, 
core organizational triad, triad of 
knowledge bodies. 




S/B/C Relation formation 





Conceptual NA Services Loss of the buyer’s bridge position 
should be mitigated by a bridge 
decay arrangement which keeps the 
buyer involved in the customer-
supplier exchange. 
16. Madhavan 
et al. (2004) 
OM-
SCM 





Empirical  Secondary 
data analysis  
Manufacturing Firms tend to form transitive triads, 
in which all firms have direct ties 
with each other. 







and performance of 
triads that span 
more than two 
levels in the supply 
chain 
(Short review of 
different 
theories) 
Empirical Multiple case 
study 
Manufacturing Propositions on how structural 
power, interdependence and 
relationship stability are related to 
dynamics in the relations in the triad. 






ops. mgt.  




insights with the 
operational 





Conceptual NA Services Service triad actors need to 
understand four critical service 
quality functionalities: definition, 
design, delivery and diagnosis. 
32 
 











Structural holes Conceptual  NA  Manufacturing As firms within a supply network 
interact over time to access, share, 
and transform resources, new ties 
between firms are formed and 
existing ties dissolve, giving rise to 
coopetition dynamics at the network 
level; definition of supply network 
archetypes.   












Empirical  Case studies  Services Firms playing a bridging role 
perceive higher cooperative 
performance; firms in a peripheral 
role experience higher levels of 
cooperative performance under high 
levels of coordination mechanism 
and trust. 
21. Raassens et 
al. (in press) 
MKT S/B/C Customer-support 
outsourcing, and 







- Empirical Event study Services Outsourcing customer support to 
emerging markets is less beneficial 
for support services that require 
direct interaction between customer 
and supplier, and highly embedded 
knowledge. 




C/S/S The effect of 










Vertical ties have a very strong 
impact on the formation of 
horizontal relationships in triads; 
triads are affected by the agency of 
customers. 















Empirical Single case 
study 
Manufacturing A triad is chosen to simplify the 
process of analysis, and not defined 
as fundamental unit within networks; 
identification of five transformation 
patterns in triads: by-pass, 
combination, bridge, displacement 
and separation. 
24. Tate et al. OM- S/C(with 
two internal 
The influence of 
contractual 
Agency theory Empirical Focus group, 
multiple case-
Services Propositions on the alignment of two 
principals (buying function and 
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company and the 
service provider 
study (marketing) marketing function as internal 
customer) within a triadic 
relationship with a supplier. 







S/B/C Designing and 
managing contracts 
for outsourcing 
Agency theory Empirical Multiple 
case-study 
Services Propositions on the suitability of 
outcome- versus behavior-based 
contracts, and on the relation 












quality in the 







Services Propositions on how buying 
organizations can control service 
delivery in triads.  
The buying organization is able to 
exert control in other phases than the 
service delivery phase. 





relationships in the 
triadic context, and 
how it can be 
shaped by the 
customer 
NA Empirical Case studies Manufacturing Develops eight archetypes, 
characterizing the different 
approaches of the customers; 
develops propositions, most of which 
concern supplier-supplier 
relationships. 




C/S/S Impact of C/S/S 
triads on supplier 
performance 
Game theory Empirical  Survey Manufacturing Buyers are able to influence the 
relational behavior between 
competing suppliers; supplier 
performance is actually lower when 
the level of S-S co-opetition is high. 
29. Wuyts et al. 
(2004) 
MKT S/B/C Business buyers’ 
preferences 
for specific types 





Manufacturing Customers value sequences of 
selective strong ties and sequences of 
more numerous weak ties; mixed 
evidence is found for customers to 
value direct access to suppliers when 
strong ties exist between the buyer 
and suppliers; customers value a 
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sequence of strong ties that run from 
suppliers through the buyer to the 
customer. 













Conceptual NA Services Structural holes and Simmelian ties 
enhance HR effectiveness; these 
relationships are moderated by HR 
task interdependence.   
* We have labeled the actors in terms of our defined three roles, cf. Fig. 1. For instance, we have relabeled a buyer as customer if that was the actor to which 
the actual goods or service delivery was directed. 
** We are defining the IMP Group as a domain by itself, as it has traditionally (and deliberately) spanned various disciplines, such as marketing, operations 








Main thoughts  Application to the study of service triads Representative 
articles  
Agency theory  Agency theory deals with the transfer of 
work from the principal to the agent, as well 
as the ensuing relationship between the two 
parties. Agency theory is concerned with 
structuring these arrangements so as to 
discourage opportunistic behavior in 
situations with diverging goals and risk 
preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). These 
arrangements include incentive and reward 
structures that prevent this behavior from 
happening.  
Consistent with agency theory the contractual 
arrangements in service triads (where part of the work is 
transferred to supply-chain service partners) usually focus 
on collaboration and gain sharing, with both partners 
committing to common goals. Contracts have the primary 
purpose of defining incentive and reward structures. This 
stands in contrast to more power-based and adversarial 






Balance theory Balance theory suggests that individuals seek 
balanced relationships or ‘cognitive 
consistency’ (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003: 42) in 
their relationships with others. Balance 
theory rests on reciprocity and the desire that 
friends are friends with each other. 
Triads function best in a balanced state, i.e. when there is 
agreement among the three members. If unbalance exists, 
members seek to create balance, according to the theory’s 
structural theorem (Cartwright and Harary, 1956). Using 
balance theory, relationship formation patterns in triads 









(KBV) of the 
firm 
With its roots in the RBV, the knowledge-
based view (KBV) of the firm suggests that 
long-term performance advantages are 
created by firms that best acquire, distribute, 
and use knowledge assets (Grant, 1996). 
The primary objective of a service triad may be the 
solicitation or acquisition of knowledge from a third-party, 
which may have specialized intelligence able to facilitate 
the exchange between two parties. Knowledge provided 
can enhance coordination and enable the smooth flow of 
business.  






view (RBV) of 
the firm  
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm 
focuses on the creation and exploitation of 
unique resources (Barney, 1991, Wernerfelt, 
1984). Resources that are valuable, rare, 
inimitable and non-substitutable, can lead to 
sustainable competitive advantage, the basic 
premise of the RBV.  
 
In service triads, business entities can take advantage of 
specialized capabilities of third-party service providers. 
These services offered can represent valuable resources 
able to differentiate the customer company contracting 
these services. In addition, having these services 
performed by specialized providers ensures that the 
services are performed to high standards (since the 
provider specializes on these), and that the customer 
company can focus on its core competencies. The unique 
combination of customer companies and service providers 
can represent a resource by itself, as evidenced by the 
adage ‘supply chains competing against supply chains,’ 






Resource dependence theory (RDT) suggests 
that interdependencies with other firms exist 
due to one firm’s inability to be completely 
self-sufficient.  
Firms may strategically decide to align in triadic 
relationships due to the unique resources present at each 
entity. While uncertainty may be reduced through such an 
arrangement via dedicated relationships, it can also be 







Strategic choice theory places emphasis on 
the key decision makers and attributes their 
actions to the performance of the firm (Child, 
1972). Under this theory, it is not so much 
the external environment shaping the firm, 
but the decisions made by company 
leadership. Miles and Snow (1978) based 
their ensuing typology on this contention, 
and classified decision makers into 
prospectors, defenders, analyzers and 
Utilizing a service provider in a triadic relationship may 
represent a proactive stance, with decision makers taking 
risks and making bold, forward-looking decisions; 
strategic change is pursued by the disruption of existing 
routines and social fabrics (a triadic structure may 
represent such). In Miles and Snow’s (1978) framework 
these are the prospectors, aiming to achieve first-mover 
advantages by actively managing the transformation. Miles 
and Snow (2007: 462) observed: “by linking to specialist 
firms with complementary strategies and capabilities, each 
Child (1972), 





reactors, depending on their responsiveness 
or proactiveness of their decisions.  
major competitor in an industry can create its own supply 
chain”. Such specialized firms can be third-party service 
providers in a triadic exchange. 
Social network 
theory  
Social network theory suggests that 
companies strive for closer relationships with 
supply chain partners when mutual benefits 
can be achieved. The benefit can derive from 
strategic interdependencies or 
complementarities, or when access to 
knowledge, resources, markets or technology 
is sought.  
Service triads seek to utilize external networks for more 
efficient and effective change. The combination of 
knowledge and resources of network service partners can 













The theory of performance frontiers 
distinguishes between the operating and the 
asset frontiers (Schmenner and Swink, 1998) 
as representing the firm’s constraints. While 
the former can be altered by more efficient 
operating choices and approaches within the 
firm, the latter can be changed by 
investments in physical assets, technology or 
human resources. The extension of the 
operating frontier is constrained by the 
location of the asset frontier. 
The traditional approach to extend the asset frontier is to 
expend significant capital outlays. However, a firm may 
also decide to extend their asset frontier via the integration 
of supply chain service partners, leveraging both their 
tangible assets and their intangible capabilities, expertise 
and knowledge. This strategy is less rigid and more 
flexible since it obviates ‘hard’ investments; capabilities 
are available much more quickly, without the need for 











Transaction cost economics (TCE) suggests 
that firms’ governance choices should 
minimize the transaction costs of economic 
exchange (Williamson, 2008). Generally, 
TCE considers the three dimensions of asset 
Transaction costs may be minimized by the employment of 
service triads, a special form of governance choice. 
Involving a third party in the exchange has the potential to 
reduce asset specificity (since the third party has to invest 





specificity (i.e., transaction-specific 
investments), the frequency of transactions, 
and the environmental uncertainty present in 
the exchange. 
may provide similar services for multiple clients), and 
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